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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Getting drunk drivers off roadways continues to be a concern for both 
law enforcement and unsuspecting motorists throughout the country, and 
particularly in Illinois.1  In fact, according to the most recent statistics, deaths 
caused by drunk drivers increased 4.6 percent nationwide from 2011 to 2012 
and accounted for over 10,300 lost lives.2  Here at home, Illinois was 
responsible for the ninth-most drunk driving deaths in 2012, an increase of 
15.5 percent from the previous year.3 
People all over the country are well aware of the dangers posed by 
drunk drivers, and these concerned citizens frequently report such potentially 
deadly misconduct to the police by calling 911.4  As many as six states have 
tried curbing the devastation caused by drunk drivers by enacting programs 
specifically designed to encourage tips calling about suspected drunk drivers, 
such as New Mexico’s “Drunkbusters Hotline” and Ohio’s “1-800-GRAB-
DUI” program.5 
While these states have taken targeted action through government 
initiatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to provide much guidance on 
whether a police officer can pull over a suspected drunk driver based solely 
on a 911 tip.  The inaction of the nation’s highest court, however, has not 
prevented a number of local jurisdictions from taking action through their 
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1. See Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978, 978–80 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Mich. 
Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990). 
2. 2012 Drunk Driving Fatalities by State, MADD BLOG NOVEMBER 2013 (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.madd.org/blog/2013/november/2012-drunk-driving-fatalities.html. 
3. Illinois totaled 278 drunk driving deaths in 2011 and 321 in 2012.  Id. 
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own judicial branches.6  In fact, a majority of state courts and at least one 
federal circuit court have essentially given police officers the ability to pull 
over a suspected drunk driver based solely in response to a 911 caller’s tip.7 
These more liberal jurisdictions allow police officers to pull over an alleged 
drunk driver without requiring personal observation of the driver swerving 
or otherwise engaging in criminal activity, so long as a 911 caller’s allegation 
contains some reliable information.8  
However, a number of other states—including Illinois—have yet to 
fully adopt this open-minded approach, which has left appellate courts, 
practicing attorneys, and police officers with a patchwork of authorities 
regarding the issue.9  Moreover, the split of authorities continues to fuel the 
debate about whether 911 callers reporting drunk drivers are, by themselves, 
sufficient to provide police with reasonable suspicion to perform a justifiable 
investigatory (or Terry) stop.10 
This Comment will argue that the Illinois Supreme Court should adopt 
a clear drunk driving standard, which permits police officers—based solely 
on a 911 caller’s report of a suspected drunk driver—to assume reasonable 
suspicion exists without having to independently verify that the driver 
committed a traffic violation or engaged in some other criminal activity.  In 
other words, this blanket rule would allow all Illinois police officers 
responding to a 911 call alleging drunk driving to pull over a suspect without 
having to independently observe erratic driving, avoiding a potentially fatal 
outcome for the suspected drunk driver and other law-abiding motorists. 
Section II of this Comment will provide a brief historical background about 
the evolution of the “reasonable suspicion” standard needed for a justifiable 
traffic stop by summarizing the Fourth Amendment as well as relevant U.S. 
Supreme Court and other federal caselaw.  Section III of this Comment will 
distinguish and analyze the split of authority among Illinois’ appellate courts 
regarding 911 callers alleging drunk driving and the ability of these 
complaints to give rise to reasonable suspicion, allowing police to perform a 
proper investigatory traffic stop.  Section IV of this Comment will analyze 
and discuss the justifications and potential problems regarding a blanket 
drunk driving exception in Illinois.  Finally, Section V of this Comment will 
summarize the concepts and emphasize the need for a clear standard, or 
                                                                                                                           
6. See Denise N. Trauth, Requiring Independent Police Corroboration of Anonymous Tips Reporting 
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exception, in Illinois with respect to 911 tips alleging drunk drivers and 
investigatory Terry stops. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:  THE FEDERAL TREND 
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to interpret and 
apply the Fourth Amendment search and seizure clause while, at the same 
time, ensuring its most basic protections are upheld in light of evolving 
societal views. The Court has moved away from its per se warrant 
requirement for proper searches and seizures towards a more lenient 
standard, holding traffic stops may be performed based on reasonable 
suspicion, a lesser standard than probable cause.11 While the Court has 
adopted a “totality of the circumstances” analysis to determine whether an 
anonymous tip is reliable enough to provide reasonable suspicion, the Court 
still has yet to explicitly hold whether a reliable tip alone satisfies the 
reasonable suspicion threshold required for police to perform a justifiable 
Terry stop in alleged drunk driving scenarios.12  
In fact, the Court passed on this exact opportunity as recently as five 
years ago in Virginia v. Harris.13  The lack of clarity on this issue was evident 
in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting opinion, where he disagreed with the 
Court’s denial of certiorari and noted: 
I am not sure that the Fourth Amendment requires such independent 
corroboration before the police can act, at least in the special context of 
anonymous tips reporting drunk driving.  This is an important question that 
is not answered by our past decisions, and that has deeply divided federal 
and state courts.  The Court should grant the petition for certiorari to answer 
the question and resolve the conflict.14 
A.  The Fourth Amendment  
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that all 
searches and seizures must be “reasonable.”15 For purposes of this 
discussion, the reasonableness requirement is made applicable to the states 
                                                                                                                           
11. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990). 
12. See generally Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268–74 (2000). 
13. See 558 U.S. 978, 978–81 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
14. Id. at 978. 
15. The Fourth Amendment provides,  
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  
 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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through the Fourteenth Amendment.16 Moreover, the Framers of the 
Constitution had two main concerns when drafting the Fourth Amendment: 
(1) to protect individual privacy and (2) to reign in unrestricted government 
activity.17 Thus, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to completely 
eliminate all contact between police officers and citizens,18 but rather, to 
protect an individual’s privacy from arbitrary invasion by government actors, 
such as the police.19  
Additionally, the Supreme Court has defined a seizure as “when, by 
means of physical force or a show of authority, [a person’s] freedom of 
movement is restrained.”20  The Court has further held a seizure only occurs 
when “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”21  Also 
pertinent to this discussion, the Court has held investigatory traffic stops 
conducted by police officers constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth 
Amendment.22 
Traditionally, police officers needed a warrant based on probable cause 
and issued by a neutral judge or magistrate to justify a constitutional search 
or seizure.23  However, because no specific definition of probable cause was 
ever articulated by the Court, this standard is based on the totality of the 
circumstances, requiring a court to take into account “facts and 
circumstances within the arresting officers’ knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient . . . to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 
committed.”24  
The Court, over time, has established a few very limited exceptions to 
the per se warrant requirement, such as cases involving hot pursuit, searches 
incident to an arrest, and searches of the place where the person is arrested 
and places in the suspect’s immediate control.25  The Court has also extended 
this exception to brief investigatory traffic stops, known today as Terry stops, 
so long as the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the search will 
produce evidence of a crime.26 
                                                                                                                           
16. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968). 
17. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 820 (1994). 
18. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). 
19. See Camara v. Mun. Court & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
20. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553. 
21. Id. at 554. 
22. United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 968 (11th Cir. 2003). 
23. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967). 
24. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959). 
25. James Michael Scears, Anonymous Tips Alleging Drunk Driving: Why “One Free Swerve” Is Too 
Many, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 759, 762 (2012). 
26. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968). 
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B.  Terry v. Ohio (1968) 
In its landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court 
established a lesser standard permitting police to perform a constitutional 
investigatory stop based on a police officer’s observations of potential 
criminal activity.27 In Terry, the Court departed from the traditional probable 
cause standard and held a police officer could conduct a brief investigatory 
stop after an easier-to-meet standard, known as “reasonable suspicion,” was 
satisfied.28  Like probable cause, the new standard was based on an officer’s 
own observations of “unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.”29 
However, the Terry Court defined this new standard as “specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.”30 
In its decision, the Terry Court held an officer can conduct a brief 
seizure and limited search to look for weapons if they observe unusual 
conduct that allows them to conclude “criminal activity may be afoot and that 
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous.”31  Under this less-demanding standard, the Court now permitted 
police officers to seize and search a person more easily without violating the 
Fourth Amendment.32 
C.  Alabama v. White (1990) 
Relying on the Gates precedent seven years earlier, which held an 
anonymous tip could give rise to probable cause based on the totality of the 
circumstances (i.e., accuracy and reliability, and basis of knowledge of the 
tipster),33 the Supreme Court in Alabama v. White specifically addressed 
whether an anonymous tip could give rise to the less-demanding reasonable 
suspicion standard.34  
To make this determination, the White Court abided by the elements of 
reliability in the Gates totality of the circumstances approach and required 
the tip to be sufficiently corroborated, or independently verified, by the police 
prior to performing a stop.35  Allowing the tip to be sufficiently and 
independently observed by police gave the Court a predictive element, which 
                                                                                                                           
27. Id. at 21–22. 
28. Id. at 22. 
29. Id.  
30. Id. at 21. 
31. Id. at 20.  
32. See id. at 22. 
33. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983). 
34. 496 U.S. 325, 327–31 (1990). 
35. Id. at 328–31. 
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played a major role in its decision to allow investigatory stops based on a 
reliable tip.36 
In its decision, the White Court determined the tip was reliable because 
of its accurate predictions of the suspect’s future behavior, such as arriving 
at a specific location carrying a brown case.37  The Court also noted the same 
essential factors of the Gates totality of the circumstances analysis were 
applicable to the reasonable suspicion context but emphasized that only a 
minimal showing of those factors was required to meet this less-demanding 
standard.38  Specifically, the White Court held anonymous tips usually 
contain three elements to satisfy reasonable suspicion: (1) they are specific 
enough so police can conclude it is based on first-hand knowledge; (2) they 
are predictive enough of some future behavior of the subject; and (3) they are 
able to be corroborated by police.39 
After this groundbreaking decision, a number of lower courts began 
using the White precedent to uphold investigatory traffic stops based on 
anonymous tips when police were only corroborating descriptive details 
before the traffic stop.40  This trend was especially pronounced in cases where 
anonymous tipsters alleged drunk driving or illegal possession of a firearm.41 
D.  Florida v. J.L. (2000) 
But just as the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to be greatly diminishing 
the level of suspicion required for Terry stops, the Supreme Court in Florida 
v. J.L. bucked the trend.42  In its decision, the J.L. Court determined a vague, 
anonymous tip did not establish the requisite reasonable suspicion needed for 
a brief seizure, or investigatory stop, because it did not contain any predictive 
information for police to independently verify and lacked reliability in its 
“assertion of illegality.”43  Although this appeared to be a step backwards, 
the Court’s suggestive language in dicta suggested something else.44  In dicta, 
                                                                                                                           
36. Id. at 331–32. 
37. Id. at 332. 
38. Id. at 328–29.  The Court noted,  
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that 
reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or 
content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that 
reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to 
show probable cause. 
 Id. at 330. 
39. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 483–84 
(2008). 
40. Scears, supra note 25, at 766–67. 
41. Id. 
42. See 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000). 
43. Id. at 272–74.  
44. See generally id. at 273–74. 
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the Court opined that other more dangerous or less invasive situations could 
arise that could justify getting rid of the reliability typically required in a tip 
to conduct a justifiable Terry stop.45 
Although the J.L. Court rejected the government’s argument that 
firearms were dangerous enough to lessen the reliability requirement under 
the totality of the circumstances test, it notably left open the possibility that 
other situations could arise that inhibit public safety enough—such as a 
person carrying a bomb or in places where a decreased expectation of privacy 
exists—where it would be justified to dramatically lower the reliability 
required by an anonymous tip.46  In other words, the Court suggested other 
more pressing situations could arise that would not necessarily require police 
to independently verify a tip to ensure it was reliable.47 
A dissenting Chief Justice John Roberts opined that the question of 
whether J.L. applied to anonymous tips reporting drunk or erratic driving 
remained unsettled, and it was unclear whether the Fourth Amendment 
requires “independent corroboration before police can act in a drunk driving-
anonymous tip scenario.48  Thus, federal and state courts have been left to 
interpret this suggestive language in J.L. and apply it however they see fit. 
E.  United States v. Wheat (2001) 
Focusing on the indicative language in J.L., the United States Eighth 
Circuit Court in United States v. Wheat held an anonymous tip alleging a 
person was driving erratically was sufficient to give rise to reasonable 
suspicion under the totality of the circumstances.49  The court reached its 
conclusion despite the fact the police officer did not personally observe the 
driver engage in any erratic driving before pulling the vehicle over.50  Instead, 
the police officer located the vehicle described by the 911 caller and, soon 
thereafter, conducted a Terry stop.51  
                                                                                                                           
45. Id. at 273–74. 
46. In its opinion, the Court in dicta noted,  
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which 
the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even 
without a showing of reliability.  We do not say, for example, that a report of a person 
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person 
carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.  Nor do we hold 
that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth 
Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports, and schools, cannot conduct 
protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere. 
 Id. 
47. See generally id. 
48. Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978, 978 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
49. 278 F.3d 722, 729 (8th Cir. 2001). 
50. Id.  
51. See id. 
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In its decision, the court noted an erratic driver who is potentially drunk 
poses a unique, imminent threat to public safety and, therefore, a lesser 
standard of reliability pertaining to the anonymous tip should be permitted, 
allowing police to make a justifiable traffic stop.52  
The federal circuit court also noted two critical distinctions exist 
between the dangers of drunk driving, like in Wheat, and cases involving an 
alleged gun possessor, like in J.L.53  First, a police officer responding to an 
alleged unlawful possession report may initiate a simple consensual 
encounter for which no articulable suspicion is required; but, this is clearly 
impossible with a moving vehicle.54  Additionally, a police officer 
responding to a tip alleging unlawful possession may quietly observe the 
suspect for a longer period of time to watch for other indications of criminal 
activity that would give rise to reasonable suspicion; however, alleged drunk 
driving scenarios are vitally different.55  In this instance, a police officer has 
two choices: (1) intercept the vehicle immediately, or (2) follow and observe 
the driver, waiting for an erratic movement, which could result in a 
devastating, if not fatal, collision.56  
Therefore, due to the imminent danger of drunk driving, the Wheat 
Federal Court held a substantial governmental interest exists in effectuating 
a traffic stop as quickly as possible in an alleged drunk driving scenario.57 
III.  ILLINOIS’ SPLIT OF AUTHORITY 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of whether 
independent police verification is required before performing a Terry stop 
when responding to 911 tips alleging drunk driving, Illinois has failed to 
apply or adopt a consistent approach.  Although the Illinois legislature has 
essentially codified the Terry decision in its Criminal Code,58 the Court’s 
lack of guidance has created a patchwork of authority throughout the state, 
leaving police officers, practitioners, and judges with no clear standard to 
consistently apply or put into practice. 
As noted previously, Illinois’ current split is evident among its appellate 
districts.  For instance, Illinois’ Fourth Appellate District has adopted a more 
liberal approach, which a majority of other states and at least one federal 
                                                                                                                           
52. Id. at 736. 
53. Id.   
54. Id.  
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 737.  
58. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (1968). 
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circuit court have followed.59  The Fourth District has held 911 tips alleging 
drunk driving are sufficient by themselves to justify an investigatory stop, so 
long as the tip satisfies certain factors indicating its reliability.60  Moreover, 
Illinois’ Fifth Appellate District coincides with the Fourth District, which has 
held no independent police verification of an anonymous tip is required to 
pull over a suspected drunk driver, due to the imminent danger that the 
situation poses to the general public.61  This is the same rationale used by the 
Fourth District court, too.62 
On the other hand, Illinois’ Second Appellate District has taken a more 
hardline approach regarding this issue, holding police officers need more 
than a just 911 caller’s allegation of drunk driving, such as independent 
police verification or a more detailed basis for the tipster’s allegation, to pull 
over a driver.63  For example, a tipster’s vague description that they had been 
“cut off” by a driver64 or an allegation of a “possible drunk driver” on the 
road65 is not sufficient by themselves to justify a Terry stop, due to lack of 
reasonable suspicion.66 
Thus, a hodgepodge of authority exists throughout the Land of Lincoln, 
leaving police officers confused about whether they can pull over a suspected 
drunk driver in response to a 911 call without personally observing any 
erratic driving. 
A.  Illinois Criminal Code and Supreme Court 
The Illinois legislature has attempted to codify the holding in Terry in 
section 107–14 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides: 
A peace officer . . . may stop any person in a public place for a reasonable 
period of time when the officer reasonably infers from the circumstances 
that the person is committing, is about to commit or has committed an 
offense . . . and may demand the name and address of the person and an 
explanation of his actions.67 
Additionally, the temporary questioning will take place in the vicinity of 
where the person or vehicle was stopped.68 
                                                                                                                           
59. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 729; People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see generally 
People v. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d 587, 595–96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
60. See generally Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 595–96. 
61. People v. Stewart, No. 5-10-0264, 2011 WL 10501179, at *2-3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
62. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 597. 
63. City of Crystal Lake v. Hurley, 2011 IL App (2d) 110352-U, ¶¶ 6-12. 
64. Id. ¶ 10. 
65. City of Lake Forest v. Dugan, 564 N.E.2d 929, 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
66. See, e.g., Hurley, 2011 IL App (2d) 110352-U, ¶ 10; Dugan, 564 N.E.2d at 930. 
67. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (1968). 
68. Id. 
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Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court has explained that police officers 
must point to specific, articulable facts to justify a Terry stop that, when 
considered under the totality of the circumstances, make the stop 
reasonable.69  Further, a Terry stop is not indefinite and can only last as long 
as necessary to either confirm or deny the officer’s suspicions that prompted 
the investigatory traffic stop.70  However, the Illinois Supreme Court has yet 
to rule on the issue of whether independent corroboration of a 911 tip is 
needed to give rise to reasonable suspicion in alleged drunk driving 
scenarios. 
B.  Illinois’ Fourth Appellate District  
Illinois’ Fourth Appellate District has consistently held 911 callers 
alleging drunk driving can, by themselves, give rise to reasonable suspicion 
to justify a Terry stop, so long as the tip is reliable.71  A tip’s reliability is 
determined by using a four-factor test, which allows a police officer to 
reasonably infer the suspected drunk driver is under the influence.72  In other 
words, the Fourth District allows police to pull over a suspected drunk driver 
without having to personally observe or validate any erratic driving or 
criminal activity when responding to a reliable 911 tip.73  The Fourth District 
justifies its holding in the fact that an alleged drunk driver poses an imminent 
threat to public safety, and therefore, the tip alleging drunk driving requires 
less corroboration by police.74 
For instance, the court in People v. Shafer held a telephone tip reporting 
a drunk driver gave police reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop 
without personally observing any traffic violations due to the tip’s reliability 
and the imminent public danger posed by the suspected drunk driver.75  In its 
decision, Shafer adhered to a four-factor test76 to determine the tip’s 
                                                                                                                           
69. People v. Ledesma, 795 N.E.2d 253, 262 (Ill. 2003). 
70. People v. Brown, 798 N.E.2d 800, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  
71. People v. Ewing, 880 N.E.2d 587, 595–96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 
367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
72. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 363. 
73. See generally Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 595–96. 
74. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 366; Ewing, 880 N.E.2d at 597. 
75. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 366–67. 
76. The Shafer court employed the four-factor test from a New Hampshire Supreme Court case that 
stated:  
First, whether there is a ‘sufficient quantity of information’ such as the vehicle’s make, 
model, license plate number, location and bearing, and ‘similar innocent details’ so that 
the officer may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the one the tipster identified. 
Second, the time interval between the police receiving the tip and the police locating the 
suspect vehicle.  Third, whether the tip is based upon contemporaneous eyewitness 
observations.  Fourth, whether the tip is sufficiently detailed to permit the reasonable 
inference that the tipster has actually witnessed an ongoing motor vehicle offense. 
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reliability, which has since been consistently applied in the Second Appellate 
District in subsequent caselaw.77  In Shafer, a fast-food employee notified 
police that an allegedly intoxicated driver had just ordered food in the drive-
thru, and the suspected drunk driver was pulled over shortly after leaving the 
parking lot.78  The court made mention that less rigorous corroboration of 
911 tips is required when it concerns an alleged drunk driver, noting “[an] 
informant’s tips regarding possible incidents of drunk driving require less 
rigorous corroboration than tips concerning matters presenting less imminent 
danger to the public.”79 
Similarly, the court in People v. Ewing determined a 911 caller gave 
police reasonable suspicion to pull over a suspected drunk driver without 
requiring personal verification of erratic driving, based on the four-factor 
Shafer test.80  In Ewing, an employee called 911 to report a drunk driver that 
had just left her place of business and gave a description of the vehicle, 
including its make, model, and license plate.81  After holding the tip was 
reliable based in large part on its detailed information, the Ewing court 
emphatically distinguished between tips alleging drunk driving and those 
reporting other crimes, such as unlawful possession of a firearm.82  Most 
notably, the court, like Shafer, determined suspected drunk drivers present a 
more imminent danger to other motorists and, therefore, require lesser 
corroboration of an informant’s tip.83 
C.  Illinois’ Fifth Appellate District 
Illinois’ Fifth Appellate District also adheres to the Fourth Appellate 
District’s liberal approach, holding a reliable tip alone can justify a Terry 
stop in drunk driving scenarios because of the danger it poses to the general 
public.84 
For instance, based on Shafer, the court in People v. Stewart held a 
police officer had reasonable suspicion based solely on a 911 caller’s tip and 
could therefore conduct a justifiable Terry stop.85  In Stewart, a 911 caller 
                                                                                                                           
 State v. Sousa, 855 A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004). 
77. Similar to the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s test, the Shafer factors include: (1) the quantity 
and detail of the information received to ensure the police are pulling over the suspect described by 
the tipster; (2) the time between the tip and the police’s ability to locate the suspect; (3) whether the 
tipster’s information was based on eyewitness observations; and (4) whether the tip has sufficient 
detail.  Shafer, 868 N.E.2d at 363. 
78. Id. at 361. 
79. Id. at 366.  
80. 880 N.E.2d 587, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
81. Id. at 595–97. 
82. Id. at 597. 
83. Id. 
84. No. 5-10-0264, 2011 WL 10501179, at *3 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
85. Id. at *2.  
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reported a red Ford vehicle with a license plate of “18CU[B]S” was driving 
erratically “all over the road.”86  The tipster was following the suspect, giving 
the 911 dispatcher updated reports about the vehicle’s location and erratic 
driving.87  The police officer responded and, upon locating the vehicle, turned 
on his lights and performed a Terry stop.88  Noting informants’ tips regarding 
potential incidents of drunk driving “require less rigorous corroboration than 
tips concerning matters presenting less imminent danger to the public,” the 
Stewart court concluded the police had reasonable suspicion based solely on 
the tip to perform a justifiable Terry stop.89  Particularly, the court determined 
a police officer should not have to wait to independently observe erratic 
driving in drunk driving scenarios or obtain specific details supporting the 
tipster’s conclusion before stopping the vehicle.90 
D.  Illinois’ Second Appellate District 
Illinois’ Second Appellate District has taken a different approach when 
determining whether an anonymous tip alone can give rise to reasonable 
suspicion in alleged drunk driving cases.91 The Second District’s stricter 
approach holds a tip, by itself, is not sufficient to justify an investigatory 
traffic stop; instead, the tipster must provide police with other, additional 
information that leads them to their conclusion about the motorist’s alleged 
intoxicated state.92 In other words, police cannot stop a vehicle based only on 
a tipster’s report that a driver is intoxicated because the tipster must provide 
a specific basis for the allegation or police must independently verify the 
driver’s erratic or drunk driving before making the Terry stop.93 
The court in City of Crystal Lake v. Hurley disagreed with the Fourth 
District Court’s reasoning in Ewing, which held police are permitted to pull 
over a reported drunk driver without questioning the details of a tipster’s 
drunk driving allegation.94 In contrast, the Hurley court held a tipster’s 
assertion that an intoxicated driver swerved in front of him was not sufficient 
to give rise to reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.95  In Hurley, a 911 
caller reported he was “cut off” in a parking lot by an allegedly-intoxicated 
drunk driver; according to the court, this allegation was not enough to permit 
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police to conduct a justifiable Terry stop because it lacked requisite 
reasonable suspicion.96 Although the tip passed the four Shafer factors, the 
Hurley court went a step further and held the tipster must provide a basis for 
their conclusion, or specific details that led the caller to believe the driver 
was intoxicated, in addition to merely providing the tip.97  Thus, the caller’s 
allegation that he was “cut off” by a drunk driver was not specific enough to 
justify a Terry stop.98 
Similarly, the court in Village of Mundelein v. Minx held a tipster’s 
description of another driver’s traffic offense was too vague to permit a 
justifiable Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion.99  In Minx, a 911 caller 
reported another driver was “driving recklessly.”100  The 911 caller never 
indicated what observations led him to this conclusion, such as “whether 
defendant was speeding, running red lights, weaving between lanes, etc.”101 
But, after locating the vehicle, the police officer pulled over the suspected 
drunk driver without independently verifying any reckless or erratic 
driving.102  Although the 911 tip had some substance of reliability, the Minx 
court held it did not satisfy reasonable suspicion based on its lack of detail 
and the absence of a police officer’s personal observation of erratic driving—
one of which was needed under the totality of the circumstances.103 
Also following this line of authority, the court in City of Lake Forest v. 
Dugan held a 911 caller’s report that there was a “possible drunk driver” on 
the road did not give police authority to perform a justifiable Terry stop.104 
In Dugan, a concerned citizen reported an intoxicated driver had just left a 
gas station.105  The caller provided police with the license plate, color, and 
make of the driver’s vehicle.106  A few minutes later, a police officer located 
the vehicle and followed the driver for some time.107  But, without 
independently verifying anything indicating the driver was intoxicated, the 
police officer pulled over the driver and arrested him because he was, not 
surprisingly, under the influence of alcohol.108  However, because the 
concerned citizen failed to provide any specific facts that supported her 
conclusion about the driver’s intoxicated state, the Dugan court held the 
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caller failed to sufficiently corroborate the complaint to justify the stop.109 
Therefore, the Terry stop was invalidated.110 
IV.  ANALYSIS  
 There is little debate about whether drinking and driving is a serious 
and potentially deadly dilemma plaguing roadways throughout the 
country.111 The only debate is whether police can curb this criminal behavior 
by pulling over a suspected drunk driver without independently 
corroborating a 911 tip—an important debate that has not been resolved by 
either the U.S. Supreme Court or the Illinois Supreme Court.112  
The many jurisdictions that permit police to pull over a suspected drunk 
driver without personally observing erratic driving or drunken-like behavior 
find comfort in a number of justifications.113 The stakes are high, they say, 
and the danger is real in these types of scenarios.114 For one, an intoxicated 
person behind the wheel poses an imminent danger to the public and the 
potential benefits of such a rule outweigh its potential costs or negative 
effects.115 Moreover, given the situation, it is impractical to require police to 
wait several minutes to independently verify erratic driving because that 
period of time could be dangerous or even fatal.  Another justification is that 
the expectation of privacy enjoyed by individuals is diminished on the open 
road and the privileges of the Fourth Amendment should therefore also be 
somewhat diminished, allowing for police to pull someone over without 
having to corroborate a 911 tip.116 And, finally, eyewitness tips alleging 
drunk driving have become increasingly reliable, and it is therefore 
unnecessary and illogical for police to have to wait for the allegedly 
intoxicated driver to commit a traffic violation before pulling them over.117 
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A.  Immediate Danger Posed by a Drunk Driver 
Arguably the most widely-accepted justification for adopting a drunk 
driving exception is the very unique and imminent danger an intoxicated 
person behind the wheel poses to the general public.118 As discussed 
previously, the majority of Illinois’ appellate courts have recognized that a 
drunk driver presents an imminent danger to the public that is more 
challenging to thwart successfully by means other than a Terry stop.119  
As the Shafer court pointed out, it would be irresponsible for a police 
officer, having received a tip alleging drunk driving, to be required to abide 
by a wait-and-see approach and merely follow the suspected driver’s car, 
waiting for potentially devastating results to occur.120 Additionally, 
concerned citizens contacting the police are often a “truly extraordinary” and 
selfless, good Samaritan-type occurrence.121  Citizens that overcome their 
reluctance to call 911 should be rewarded for their courage because they 
report alleged drunk driving out of a sense of protection for the greater 
good.122  They are not necessarily looking out for themselves; rather, they are 
looking out for others, a virtue to reward—not to ignore.123 
Similarly, a number of other state supreme courts have implemented 
this rationale in their holdings. For instance, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
has held, although no blanket rule exists, extraordinary dangers, such as 
drunk driving, sometimes justify extraordinary precautions.124  Likewise, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court mentioned intoxicated drivers, which it referred 
to as “moving time bombs,” pose a significant risk to themselves as well as 
the public and these types of situations therefore warrant a lesser degree of 
police corroboration.125 
Additionally, the dangers in drunk driving scenarios are heightened 
compared to dangers in other situations, such as an alleged firearm or drug 
possession, which require greater Fourth Amendment protections.126 For 
instance, courts find extraordinary danger in “a vehicle’s mobility; the 
unpredictability of a driver’s actions; the observable nature of erratic driving 
. . . and a lack of alternatives for police investigation of drunk driving.”127  
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An anonymous report of erratic or drunk driving presents a greater need for 
prompt action by police.128 
Furthermore, the options police officers have are extremely limited 
when responding to a 911 tip in these situations.129  For instance, an officer 
can either pull over the suspected drunk driver immediately to check if the 
driver is under the influence of alcohol, avoiding a potentially dangerous 
situation, or an officer can take a hands-off approach and quietly follow the 
driver, waiting for the driver to swerve or commit another traffic violation.130 
Choosing the latter will undoubtedly result in one of three outcomes: (1) the 
suspected drunk driver will continue down the road and make it safely to his 
destination; (2) the suspected drunk driver will mindlessly weave in-and-out 
of traffic lanes, injuring nobody, but nonetheless corroborating the 
informant’s tip and justifying a Terry stop; or (3) the suspected drunk driver 
will swerve into oncoming traffic or fail to stop at a red light at a busy 
intersection, slamming into another vehicle and killing any number of 
unsuspecting motorists.131  
As Chief Justice John Roberts noted in Virginia v. Harris, consider the 
sheer difficultly for a police officer to explain to a grieving family that, 
although police knew through a 911 tip that the driver of the car that swerved 
into their son’s or father’s lane was intoxicated, “they were powerless to pull 
him over, even for a quick check” because of the wait-and-see mandate.132  
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in J.L. refused to speculate explicitly 
about which types of dangerous circumstances would justify a drunk driving 
exception, the Court did in fact hypothesize in dicta that a 911 report of a 
“person carrying a bomb” did not need to have the same indicia of reliability 
that is required in less dangerous scenarios before police can constitutionally 
conduct a seizure.133 
Similarly, the Illinois’ Fourth Appellate District in Schafer agreed with 
the Court’s “ticking time bomb” analysis, stating intoxicated drivers are 
indeed “moving time bombs.”134  It therefore follows that intoxicated drivers 
behind the wheel are uniquely dangerous to the general public and these 
situations should not require the same level of corroboration other scenarios 
do.135 
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B.  Reliability of and Potential Abuse by Tipsters 
Further, many jurisdictions, including the majority of Illinois’ appellate 
districts, consider 911 tips alleging drunk drivers much more reliable than 
anonymous tips alleging other criminal activity, such as illegal possession of 
drugs or firearms.136  Unlike tips alleging a person has a firearm, where a 
predictive element may be the only way police can corroborate the tipster’s 
knowledge, the tip in drunk driving cases almost always comes from 
eyewitness observations, which inherently increases the tip’s reliability.137 
Although many critics of a drunk driving exception argue it could be 
abused in petty ways by feuding neighbors or family members, ultimately 
wasting the police department’s time, this argument is an exaggerated one. 
Specifically, “[g]iven the intricacies and improbabilities that would be 
involved in seeking to harass another by a report of reckless or erratic driving, 
it seems highly unlikely that such a report will have been fabricated for that 
purpose.”138 
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently clarified this point 
regarding 911 calls and their reliability.  The Court stated: 
The recorded call and its subsequent transcript show both the caller’s basis 
of information and the caller’s reliability.  The fact that the police agency 
either knew the identity of the caller or had the means to discover the 
caller’s identity enhances the caller’s credibility.  The police were in a 
position to go back to their source.  If the information provided had turned 
out to be untrue, the police would have been able to follow up and confront 
the caller, demand an explanation, and pursue criminal charges.139 
Therefore, the risk of feuding citizens abusing the drunk driving 
exception is relatively low.  Even if the critics’ fears were to come true, the 
possibility of that abuse happening is most certainly outweighed by the 
strong government interest in getting drunk drivers off the road as soon as 
possible.140 
Along those same lines, 911 tips can no longer be considered truly 
“anonymous,” which greatly increases a 911 tip’s reliability and decreases 
the likelihood for potential abuse or harassment.141  By calling 911, the tipster 
puts their anonymity at risk, which increases the tip’s reliability.142  In other 
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words, tipsters who call 911 are more reliable compared to anonymous 
informants who mail a letter to police with no return address because their 
phone numbers can be easily traced seconds after making initial contact with 
the 911 dispatcher.143  Caller identification systems with the ability to track 
phone numbers are widely available and currently used by law enforcement 
agencies across Illinois.  So, “if anonymous tips are proving unreliable and 
distracting to police, squad cars can be sent within seconds to the location of 
the telephone used by the informant” and police can arrest the phony caller.144 
In other words, tipsters’ reports to 911 have a greater degree of reliability 
than anonymous tips and require less corroboration.145  
Moreover, some critics may further argue a tipster can use the same 
advances in technology to block the police from tracking the location of their 
call, but this argument is also misplaced because the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) rules eliminate this from the realm of 
possibilities.146  In fact, the same FCC rules that allow someone to block their 
number from another person’s caller identification service by dialing *67 
actually prohibit this same action for calls seeking emergency assistance, 
such as 911.147  Thus, even when a person dials *67 before dialing 911, the 
phone number will still be seen and available to the emergency dispatcher on 
the other end of the call, and police will be able to track the phone number’s 
location.148  The same is true for cellular phones, as the FCC rules require 
service providers to have the ability to pinpoint the location of all cell phones 
that dial 911, which allows police to respond and assist the caller 
immediately.149 
C.  Lesser Expectation of Privacy on the Road  
Another justification for courts that permit investigatory traffic stops in 
these situations is the fact that a driver enjoys a lesser expectation of privacy 
in a vehicle on the open road.150  Thus, because an investigatory traffic stop 
on the road is less invasive than a typical Fourth Amendment search and 
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seizure, a lesser standard of reliability should be required for tips to meet the 
constitutional reasonableness requirements.151 
Although a driver does not lose all reasonable expectations of privacy 
in an automobile, the Illinois Supreme Court has held a driver’s expectation 
of privacy is greatly diminished because the vehicle and its use are subject to 
various Illinois regulations.152  For instance, in Illinois, a driver must meet a 
number of requirements, including obtaining a valid driver’s license by 
passing vision and written examinations, acquiring appropriate vehicle 
insurance, having current vehicle registration, title, tag, and license plate, and 
wearing a seatbelt, among others.153  Regulations in Illinois, such as these, 
have led the U.S. Supreme Court to hold a person has a lesser expectation of 
privacy when they are behind the wheel.154 
The Supreme Court in J.L. similarly noted that areas where a person has 
a lesser expectation of privacy, such as airports and schools, do not warrant 
the type of corroboration, or independent verification, traditionally needed 
for justifiable searches compared to other areas where a person has a stronger 
sense of privacy.155  In fact, while driving on the open road, a person expects 
a lesser level of privacy than one expects within the walls of their 
residence.156 
Further, some proponents of the drunk driving exception have 
analogized an investigatory traffic stop to that of a roadside sobriety 
checkpoint, which does not require any police corroboration before briefly 
questioning the driver.157  Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in this context, the 
Illinois Supreme Court stated “one’s expectation of privacy in an automobile 
and of freedom in its operation are significantly different from the traditional 
expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”158  
To justify sobriety checkpoints, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
individuals driving on public roads enjoy a lower expectation of privacy 
while on those open thoroughfares.159  It follows that this lower expectation 
of privacy diminishes the constitutional safeguards put in place by the Fourth 
Amendment, which further justifies the need to institute a policy that allows 
police to immediately pull over suspected drivers without corroboration. 
Additionally, by balancing the government intrusiveness of a traffic 
stop with the government’s strong interest in shielding citizens from the 
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potentially-devastating effects of drunk driving, traffic stops are the only 
reasonable method available to police officers to protect this compelling 
interest.160 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, a number of justifications suggest why the Illinois Supreme 
Court should adopt a “drunk driving exception,” allowing police officers to 
assume reasonable suspicion exists based solely on a 911 caller’s report of 
an intoxicated driver without having to independently view a traffic violation 
or otherwise observe other criminal activity.  
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to resolve this question, it 
appears quite evident that the Court throughout the years has given police 
more leniency to perform Fourth Amendment searches and seizures.  This is 
evident in the Court’s shift from the per se warrant requirement towards the 
less-demanding probable cause standard, and now to today’s approach, 
which holds Terry stops can be conducted based solely on reasonable 
suspicion, an even lesser standard than probable cause. 
Additionally, due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s inaction, Illinois 
appellate courts, attorneys, and police officers are left with a patchwork of 
authority throughout the state.  Although two of Illinois’ appellate districts 
have apparently put into place this drunk driving exception, a blanket rule 
requiring all jurisdictions to adopt this approach would bring stability and 
eliminate the confusing split of authority in Illinois. 
Finally, a number of justifications relied upon by the courts that already 
adopt this approach suggest applying this exception in Illinois is not only 
constitutional, but sensible.  Drunk driving poses a unique risk to the general 
public and, therefore, requiring a wait-and-see approach or independent 
corroboration of 911 tips is impractical and potentially devastating. 
Moreover, 911 tips have become increasingly reliable, and independent 
police corroboration is unnecessary and downright burdensome, given the 
advances in technology—particularly with regard to identifying 911 callers. 
The risk of potential abuse or harassment under this exception is also 
overstated.  Finally, persons enjoy a lesser expectation of privacy driving on 
public roads and the requirements needed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment 
should therefore also be diminished. 
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